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1 Introduction 
This paper presents an extension to the paper of Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003), "Saving in 
Germany" which evaluated the 2001 SAVE study to shed light on the savings behavior of German 
households. 
The main findings of Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003), briefly, are: Overall, they find 
extraordinarily stable savings patterns. More than 40% of German households save regularly a fixed 
amount. About 25% of German households plan their savings and have a clearly defined savings 
target in mind. Most of German household saving is in the form of contractual saving, such as 
saving plans, whole life insurance and building society contracts; see Walliser and Winter (1999) 
for review. This makes the flow of saving rather unresponsive to economic fluctuations, such as 
income shocks. Most households prefer to cut consumption if ends do not meet. In particular the 
elderly do not like to use credit cards, and they eschew debt. 
This paper will add new insight to the results from Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003) with the 
new available SAVE data from the year 2003.1 These new data are composed by two different 
subsamples. The first one is a panel sample from households being asked in both available waves, 
while the second one is an additional 'refreshment sample'. Methodological aspects of the SAVE 
data will not be discussed in this paper; they are summarized in Essig (2005). In order to distinguish 
year and sample effects, all results will be presented pooled and separately for each subsample if 
possible.2 
At the time field work for this survey has been done (June 2001 and June 2003) several 
political incidents had strong influence 
The gap between the June 2001 and June 2003 - when the field work has been done -was a time 
of destructive political events worldwide, beginning with the attacks against the WTC, followed by 
the war against Afghanistan and ending with the third, still ongoing gulf war. These events brought 
up a time of insecurity all over the world. 
In Germany, two additional events took place in that time span. First, the Euro was introduced 
as hard cash in Germany on January 1, 20023, and ever since there was a discussion of an additional 
inflation induced by that introduction. Even the German Minister of Finance, Hans Eichel, publicly 
called to boycott presumed inflationary industries using the Euro to 'raise prices and profits' in May 
                                                          
1 This paper was written excluding the 2004 TPI subsample, cf. Essig (2005), since this subsample was not available 
until the end of August 2004. An exception is Section 4 where results for the new included risk variables are presented. 
2 Panel analysis is, by construction, only possible for the CAPI 2001 and 2003 subsamples. 
3 while it was already introduced as the official currency of the European Monetary Union on January 1, 1999. 
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2002. While some researches demonstrate that this inflationary feeling is due to risen prices of only 
some products in the basket4, see Ifo Institut (2002), others refer to psychological phenomena like 
biased assimilation and attitude polarization, see Frey et al. (2002). Second, even though the 
demographic changes of the aging population in Germany are well known for years, there has not 
been a large public debate on the pension and social security system in Germany. This definitely 
changed with the installation of the so-called 'Ruerup-Commission'5 in 2003; recommendations of 
the commission were also published before the field work of the second wave. The main message 
of the commission's report are, very briefly, that private old-age provision and health-care will 
become more and more important. Even if the majority of the population might have implicitly 
doubted the long-run stability of the social security systems, the problem is now much more 
obvious. 
So, indeed, the situation in 2003 is different to the one in 2001 in many respects. And for that 
reason reading the SAVE data again might be an instructive exercise. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the present, the past and the future of 
the Germans' judgement of their well-being in the light of the possible worsening of the 
population's confidence. Section 3 reports findings for respondents' information level on and 
expectations for the public pension systems. Section 4 describes results for the recently included6 
risk questions. It tests the reliability of the experimental question design and links self-assessed risk 
to respondents' financial behavior. Section 5 summarizes the findings on these three topics. 
Due to sampling issues of the SAVE dataset (see Essig (2005)), three major questions will be 
discussed in this paper. First, will there be difference in the strict panel structure of the data, i.e., 
what are, if any, the changes between 2001 and 2003 of households being exclusively observed in 
both years? This clearly offers the most interesting research fundament since values can compare 
households one by one. Second, do households differ in the two 2003 subsamples? If not, this 
would allow pooling of the two 2003 subsamples, as was the case in 2001, see Börsch-Supan and 
Essig (2003). Third, pooling subsamples in years, are there significant changes between 2001 and 
2003? The abundance of tables and figures requires showing only significant ones. All other not 
shown but mentioned results will be available by the author on request. 
All presented values underlying every table and figure in this paper will be weighted across 
subsamples. See Essig (2005), for a discussion of the data's representativeness and the construction 
of used weights. The chosen weights from that chapter refer to the dimensions subsamples, net 
                                                          
4 which were often due to higher taxes, e.g. on alcohol and tobacco. 
5 Cf. the report of the Kommission zur Nachhaltigkeit der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003). 
6 In the SAVE 2004 wave, surveyed in June/July 2004. 
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household income, and age. 
2 Well-being and living situation 
This section shows values for the respondents' evaluation of the present, the past and the future. 
Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003) found that the majority of those surveyed consider that their 
situation is really positive, what may be a surprise because of the Germans' rather pessimistic 
reputation. The question asked here is whether these findings can be affirmed two years later. 
2.1 The present 
What variables would be influenced by the time change between 2001 and 2003? This is the topic 
of this subsection. As argued in the introduction, the exogenous shocks in 2001, 2002 and 2003 
might have caused or induced a change of behavior. But has it also changed personal contentment? 
This will be analyzed looking at five variables: health, work, housing, income, and the general 
living situation.7 It might well be the case that in general, respondents feel worse in general 2001 
than in 2003 (living situation), but when directly asked to certain specific categories, one does not 
observe significant changes at all. 
2.1.1 Panel results 
Figure 1 compares households observed in both years,8 while Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
differences between the two years. Taking a scale from 0 to 10, which ranges from "completely 
discontent" to "very content", the majority of those surveyed classed themselves in the middle (the 
rating 5) or to the right of this (values 6 to 10). One can see no tremendous change in the pictures of 
the satisfaction items. The influence of deteriorated exogenous factors on the individual well-being 
is thus not directly reflected in the contentment variables. Running Ordered probit regressions9 
separate for all of these five variables on a constant and a dummy for the second wave one can see 
the results suggested by Figure 1 proved: only in the regression of the general living contentment 
                                                          
7 The exact wording was: "You will see a list of things that carry a certain significance in life. Please state according to 
a scale of 1 to 10 in how far you are content with the respective aspect. 0 means very discontented and 10 means very 
content. How content are you in regard to: (a) your health? (b) Your job? (c) Your housing? (d) Your income? (e) Your 
standard of living in general?". 
8 A so-called 'flag' filter (a variable controlling for respondent identity within each household) was introduced to 
eliminate observations when a respondent change in 2003 was suspected (e.g., the partner of the year 2001 is the 
respondent in 2003); this was done when the gender of the interviewee differed.  One thereby loses 4 observations (2 in 
each wave since only a fully balanced panel is considered.). A different flag filter based on the interviewee's birth year 
proved to be problematic since it changed sometimes only by one year, leaving the possibility that respondents rather 
fib about their age (32 cases) than actually observing a real respondent change. This is much less less likely for the 
gender variable, reducing the type-I - error (incorrectly dropping observations) practically to zero. 
9 Not shown here, but available on request. 
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variable shows a significant deterioration in 2003 can be observed. This seems to back the 
hypothesis from the previous paragraph that respondents, when asked specifically, will not translate 
these changed environmental conditions into an adaption of evaluating present contentment.10 
2.1.2 Other results 
Figure 3 andFigure 4 show the analog results for the comparison of the two SAVE 2003 subsamples 
and between the pooled 2001 and 2003 subsamples. The figures leave us with two insights. First, 
there are no profound differences between the two SAVE 2003 subsamples,11 and second, the 
satisfaction level did not change in a large scope between 2001 and 2003. A figure comparable to 
Figure 2 is of course not feasible since this can only be done when we observe households more 
than once. 
2.2 The past 
2.2.1 Panel results 
These assessments are supported by past experience. Table 1 focuses the attention on the income 
situation. Those surveyed were asked to compare their current income situation with the situation 
five years ago.12 The table shows that more households are in a significantly better situation than 
are in a significantly worse situation. The improvement in income in the middle category is 
particularly noticeable: whereas 25.1% of households verify that their income situation is 'slightly 
better' than it was five years ago, only 13.8% ascertain that they are in a slightly worse position. 
Just under a third of those households surveyed remain at the same level.13 
 
Table 1: Change of the income situation 
   2001   
2003 Significantly better Slightly better About the same Slightly worse Sign. worse
Significantly better 28 16 9 3 0
                                                          
10 Calculating t tests for the means of these variables, we see in every case lower means in 2003 than in 2001, only one 
of them (for housing) being significant. The problem of this procedure is that values of these variables cannot be 
interpreted as cardinal values. 
11 Remember, all tables and figures present weighted values. 
12 The exact wording was: "Is your income situation, compared with five years ago (a) significantly better (b) slightly 
better (c) about the same (d) slightly worse (e) significantly worse?" This question was followed by: "During the last 
five years, did your income (a) Fluctuate significantly (b) Fluctuate slightly (c) Not fluctuate at all?" 
13 Zaller (1992) investigates variability over time for attitude changes within a four months period. The five item 
answers (where one of them was a "don't know"-item) were only equivalent in 48% of the cases; in Table 1, we find 
equivalent answers after two years in 38.5% of the cases (which are marked along the cross-diagonal in the table). On 
the one hand, keeping the Zaller's results in mind, one has to be careful interpreting the observed changes as real time 
effects; on the other hand, we observe a skewness towards a more pessimistic assessment, analog to the results in 
Section 2.1. 
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 31.5% 11.4% 6.5% 5.9% 0.0% 
Slightly better 28 54 26 7 7 
 31.5% 38.6% 18.8% 13.7% 18.0% 
About the same 17 46 64 15 8 
 19.1% 32.9% 46.4% 29.4% 20.5% 
Slightly worse 9 14 25 14 8 
 10.1% 10.0% 18.1% 27.5% 20.5% 
Significantly worse 7 10 14 12 16 
 7.9% 7.1% 10.1% 23.5% 41.0% 
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003. 
Note: Row values add to 100% per column. 
The direct comparison of the evaluation of the income situation is shown in Figure 5. 
Compared to the evaluation in 2001, the evaluation in 2003 is more evenly distributed: the share of 
respondents claiming that their income situation worsened in the last five years almost doubled in 
2003 compared to 2001. 
 
Table 2: Income fluctuations during the last 5 years 
  2001  
2003 Significant fluctuation Slight fluctuation No fluctuation at all 
Significant fluctuation 35 41 16 
 40.7% 18.7% 11.3% 
Slight fluctuation 37 121 62 
 43.0% 55.3% 43.7% 
No fluctuation at all 14 57 64 
 16.3% 26.0% 45.1% 
 
In households where any change at all occurred, it appears that these tended to be minimal, as can 
be seen in Table 2. Only around a quarter of those surveyed indicated significant fluctuations in 
income. 
2.2.2 Other results 
Figure 6 expands the results from the past section to all SAVE 2001 and 2003 subsamples. The 
results show that differences between the two years, if pooling the subsections by year, is not 
pronounced. 
2.3 The future 
From this view of the past it might be interesting to compare the results to the view of the future. 
Figure 9 shows the future expectations of the households surveyed. First, I look at the situation of 
the individual. The perspectives for their own health, the health of their partners and their own 
financial situation are largely seen in a positive light. This is all the more astonishing because the 
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overall economic situation at the time the survey was conducted in spring 2001 and 2003 already 
showed considerable signs of a downturn - a fact that was very clear in the survey (chart on the left 
"Economic trends in Germany"). The objection that the households in SAVE are considerably 
wealthier than in the average population if no weighting is applied (see Essig (2005)) does not 
explain this observation, because the weighted income does not show any statistically significant 
differences over and above the 2000 and 2002 micro-census. 
The insight gained at the end of this section is that, in contrast to current voices of foreboding 
in respect of the downturn in the economy (which tends to be cyclical and therefore perhaps not so 
very surprising for many people) but also the threat to economic growth resulting from the general 
pessimism following the terrorist attacks, it can be seen that people give their responses in a context 
of a healthy assessment of their own situation and an economic basis of this kind. 
2.3.1 Panel results 
In contrast to the results for the present contentment variables presented in Section 2.1.1, we see a 
rather pronounced shift for the expectations of the economic situation. Figure 7 and Figure 8 show 
that especially for the economic development of Germany, households became more pessimistic in 
2003; the lowest value, zero, indicating a pure pessimistic expectation, was chosen five times as 
often in 2003 than in 2001 (from 3 to 15% of all respondents). In contrast, the own health situation 
as well as the health situation of the partner has not changed significantly. This supports the 
hypothesis from the introduction that indeed households adapted to the changed environmental 
conditions; Figure 7 and Figure 8 also prove that there is no general gloomy prophecy but 
households rather know to differ between dimensions indeed affected by environmental changes 
between 2001 and 2003 of the kind we discussed before, and dimensions like health, which are 
rather exogenous due to these changes. Another interesting result which is also known from other 
studies and from psychological literature can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8: households tend to 
think that they might not be beaten as hard as the average when conditions worsen. 
Effects on financial behavior Given the reduced optimism concerning Germany's future 
economic development, one might interested whether this translates into changed financial 
behavior. I will examine this question by two topics. First, will the precautionary saving motive 
become more important, and second, do households hold less stocks.14 
Table 3 shows differences for stock ownership rates stratified by expectations for Germany's 
                                                          
14 The small sample size for this panel analysis is a serious issue and limits some analysis to bivariate correlation tables. 
This leaves room for more detailed analysis at a later stage of the SAVE panel when more observations will be 
available. 
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economic development. Pessimists were defined as respondents whose difference between the 
expectations of 2001 and 2003 was below the median value of -2. The significant larger drop of 
ownership rates of the pessimists seems to support the findings of Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003) 
that intentions, or in this case, assessments, are supported by households' actions. 
Table 3: Differences in stock ownership rates by expectations for Germany's economic development 
 2001 2003 Difference 
Non-Pessimists  29.7%  23.1% 6.6% 
Pessimists 32.5% 22.4% 10.2% 
Notes: Unweighted values. The difference-in-difference value of 3.6% is significant at the 1%-level. 
Saving motives The SAVE questionnaire asks for judging the importance of nine savings 
motives on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'completely unimportant' and 10 'very important', 
respectively.15 Figure 12 shows the panel results for nine savings motives as the share of 
respondents judging the motives being important (defined as judgements ranging from 8 to 10). 
The analogue presentation to the previous paragraph can thus be done only implicitly since the 
answers to the savings motives are measured on an ordinal scale (cf. Footnote 10), and so a 
difference-in-difference approach is presented implicitly in Figure 12. We see slightly positive 
differences for the pessimistic households. 
To identify the effect of deteriorated confidence in Germany's economic development, I apply 
the following methodology. Again, pessimists were defined as respondents whose difference 
between the expectations of 2001 and 2003 was below the median value of -2. This adaption of 
expectations will be called the 'treatment', i.e. whether respondents reacted to the possibly changed 
economic environment. On the other hand, the 'control group' are respondents who did not adjust 
their expectations in that manner. Since the CAPI subsample was observed in 2001 and 2003, it is 
possible to control for effects which were experienced by both groups ('time effect'). When a 
control group is present, the design in psychology has been called the untreated control group 
design with pretest and posttest; see Meyer (1995). This can be identified with the difference-in-
difference technique. 
Table 4 shows results from difference-in-difference ordered probit regressions of savings 
motives on dummy variables for the year 2003 and for pessimistic households16. 
Again, the outcome, savingmotiveXi, was modeled by the following equation 
                                                          
15 Essig (2005) analyzes the importance of each of the nine saving motives in detail. In this paper, the point of interest is 
whether we can observe changes in judging the savings motives over time. 
16 Pessimism, again, is defined as the difference between the expectations of 2001 and 2003 being below the median 
value of -2. 
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( )iiiii iPessimistTimePessimistTimeveXsavingmoti εδγβα +⋅+++=  (1) 
where 
α = constant term 
ß = time trend common to control and treatment group 
γ = treatment group specific effect (to account for average permanent 
differences between treatment and control) 6 = true effect of treatment  
εi = random, unobserved 'error' term which contains all 
determinants of savingmotiveXi which the model omits 
 
Of course, this is not some difference-in-difference model in the classical sense, since in this model 
here, respondents self-selected themselves into the treatment group. In other words, I take account 
for the fact that the time trend is not common to all respondents, dividing them into two different 
groups. The objections to such an approach are summarized in Meyer (1995) who gives an 
excellent review for the validity threats to models of this kind. 
 
Table 4: Ordered probit estimates: savings motives by time and pessimism 
 Purchase of  
real estate 
Precautions for 
unexpected events 
Paying off debts Old-age provision Travelling 
 Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P> z  Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Time effect 
Group effect 
Treatment effect 
-0.099 -
0.397 
0.304 
0.227 
0.212 
0.365 
-0.202 -
0.485 
0.762 
0.009 
0.092 
0.012 
-0.045 
0.071 -
0.100 
0.572 
0.812 
0.750 
-0.010 -
0.402 
0.368 
0.902 
0.168 
0.232 
-0.090 
0.530 -
0.621 
0.234 
0.071 
0.045 
 Major purchases Education / support of 
children /grandchildren 
Bequests for children / 
grandchildren 
Taking advantage 
of state subsidies 
  
 Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P> z  Coeff. P > z   
Time effect 
Group effect 
Treatment effect 
-0.284 
-0.051 
0.143 
0.000 
0.859 
0.638 
-0.035 -
0.661 
0.546 
0.653 
0.037 
0.100 
-0.079 -
0.358 
0.253 
0.326 
0.268 
0.455 
-0.023 -
0.381 
0.251 
0.769 
0.214 
0.437 
  
Notes: Cut-off parameters are not reported. Significant parameters are highlighted. 
Table 4 reveals three very interesting results. First, respondents becoming more pessimistic 
significantly rate the precautionary savings motive more importantly (the highly significant positive 
treatment dummy takes account for that fact). Second, savings for non-durable consumption like 
travelling is negatively affected by pessimistic evaluations. Third, the old-age provision savings 
motive does not seem to be affected by more pessimistic economic evaluations (all parameters 
being insignificant in that regression), not even a pure time effect seems to be relevant. Coming 
back to the reasoning in Section 1, one can state the following: events having taken place between 
2001 and 2003 affect the evaluation of Germany's economic development in a negative way. 
Respondents whose drop in this rating is more negative than the median also rate the precautionary 
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savings motive as well as supporting their off spring more important. The ongoing discussion about 
the German pension system and the rising importance of private contributions for old-age did not 
seem to affect respondents' evaluation of this savings motive. 
3 Pensions 
The German private pension system ("public retirement insurance" / 'Gesetzliche Rentenver-
sicherung' [GRV]) which covers about 85% of the German workforce17 has undergone continuous 
reforms concerning retirement payments18 and pathways into retirement19. Börsch-Supan and Wilke 
(2003) provide a description of the recent history of institutional changes of the German pension 
system. 
This section will not go into details of the pension system's institutional background. Rather, it 
checks whether the broad discussion on the future of the German pension system which was 
intensified by the 2001 "Riester"-Reform and reinforced by proposals of the 2003 Ruerup-
commission induced changes of expectations concerning the generosity of the pension system with 
respect to the replacement rate (direct financial effect) and the pension entry age (indirect financial 
effect). 
Equation 2 presents a simplified stylized model for the effects of the two mentioned parameters: 
∑
=
−+=
T
At
At
t
A Yr
PW 11
1 α  (2) 
where 
αt       = pension replacement rate in year t 
YA-1 = income in last year before pension entry 
T = time of death 
A = pension entry age 
P W  = discounted pension wealth 
rt = discount factor in year t 
 
While T and rt are exogenous for the insured persons, this is only true for the pension entry age 
A and the replacement rate α, when there exists no compulsory retirement age. In an actuarial fair 
pension system, α and A are directly connected: the higher the pension entry age, the higher will be 
                                                          
17 Cf. Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003). 
18 Cf. Börsch-Supan et al. (2004b). 
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the replacement rate to compensate for (1) the shorter time span of pension receipts until T and (2) 
for higher accrued claims during the working life (since the expected pension wealth should equal 
the accrued pension contributions at time A). Actuarial fairness would then determine the 
replacement rate αt to ascertain this equality. Departures from actuarially fair replacement rates 
generate incentive effects, mostly to early retirement due to more 'generous' pension reforms. Many 
studies have looked at these incentives effects by microeconometric modelling (Börsch-Supan 
(1992), Schmidt (1995), Siddiqui (1997), Börsch-Supan (2000), Börsch-Supan (2001), and Börsch-
Supan et al. (2004b). See also Börsch-Supan et al. (2004a) for a review on the Germans' knowledge 
on the pension system and willingness to accept pension reforms. 
This section is structured as follows. First, I will analyze whether the mentioned discussion 
about the future of the German security systems induced changes on respondents' information level 
by exploring refusals and 'don't know' answers to pension parameter questions. As a second step, I 
examine whether respondents changed and their expectations concerning parameters of Equation 2, 
namely, the pension entry age, A, and the replacement rate, α. Third, I will inspect the importance 
of private pensions before and after the pension reform discussion. 
3.1 Information level on pension parameters 
Table 14 shows probit regression results for refusals for the expected pension entry age. Several 
results are worth noting. First, as expected, refusal is a function of age. But interestingly, the age 
polynomial's minimum is about 37 - 38 years.20 One would rather suspect that the closer one is 
away from the event of pension entry, the higher the probability that the actual year is known.21 
Interpreting refusals for this question as insecureness for knowledge, this seems surprising. Second, 
the year dummy for 2003 is highly negative significant in the respondents' regression. This can be 
interpreted that respondents in the year 2003 cared more about retire-ment than in 2001. Third, 
there seems to be evidence that refusals and therefore knowledge about own and partner's pension 
entry is correlated: respondents giving answers for themselves have a higher probability of 
answering also to the partner's question. 
3.2 Pension age 
In the SAVE questionnaire, several pension related questions were asked. As mentioned in the 
introduction, one of the interesting research topics of savings behavior is the relevance of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
19 Cf. Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003). 
20 This means that after that age, nonresponse will rise with age. 
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households' information and expectations about their pension level. As mentioned earlier in Section 
2, one would expect some reaction from households to changed economic and political 
environments. Apart from relatively soft questions like expectations, we are interested whether 
there is also some significant reaction concerning more specific questions. One major debate of the 
year 2003 was the adaption of Germany's pension system to the challenge of demographic changes. 
By that time, one of the most discussed questions was the increase of the normal pension entry age 
from 65 to 67 years. Did respondents react to that discussion, and if so, how large was the reaction? 
Table 5 shows average pension entry ages, observed ones (from the GSOEP and the VDR) and 
expected values from SAVE. 
 
Table 5: Estimated and expected pension entry age 
  SOEP 1999a VDR 2001b SAVE 2001c SAVE 2003 c 
 Men Women Men and Women Men Women Men Women 
Mean 59.7 60.7 60.2 62.9 61.9 63.5 63.0 
Median / / / 64 62 65 65 
Standard deviation  / / 3.22 2.89 4.01 3.72 
Standard error / / / 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.13 
N / / / 941 340 852 830 
a Source: Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003). 
b Source: Own calculations / data were supported by Christina B. Wilke. 
c Notes: Weighted values, pooled over subsamples. T-Tests for differences between 2001 and 2003 SAVE values are 
significant. 
The expected pension entry age is higher in SAVE than average observed values in the GSOEP and 
in data we received from the Verband der Rentenversicherungsträger (VDR). This divergence can 
have several sources. One might be that respondents are more confident concerning their future 
health or employment situation, or they are more pessimistic with regards to future pension 
regulations. 
Table 13 shows regression results from the expected pension entry age on a set of household 
and respondent characteristics. The strong positive significant effect of the time gap from 2001 to 
2003 seems to support the formerly stated hypothesis that expectations have differed between and 
2003. Also, while in the second specification dummies for both 2003 subsamples are significantly 
positive, they are not significantly different from each other. The time effect is strong. A very good 
and likely explanation is the exacerbated pension system discussion in and 2003. 
Given these findings, a compelling question arises: Do changed expectations concerning the 
future pension entry age alter the savings motive for old-age provision? The reason for that might 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
21 Or, that the variance of knowledge is a positive function of time to retirement: the closer the retirement age, the better 
the knowledge and the smaller the variance. 
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be that respondents whose expected pension entry age difference between 2003 and 2001 is above 
the median might be more pessimistic concerning the future generosity of the pension system; their 
loss of faith in the pension system might therefore correspond to a higher emphasize for private old-
age provisions.22 
The results for this procedure are insignificant. In that sense, the evaluation of the importance 
of savings motives is not affected by the changes in expectations concerning pension entry age. 
Adding first differences in expectations for the future development of Germany's economic 
situation does not bring qualitative changes. 
3.3 Pension levels 
How well are people informed about pension levels? This is as much a serious question as the 
estimated pension entry age. 
Table 15 lists probit estimation results for 'don't knows' and refusals for the replacement rates 
of pension payments in relation to the last income before retirement, while Table 16 lists results for 
the estimation for partner's values.23 
Coefficients for age are highly significant24 as one would expect them to be: the closer a person 
comes to retirement, the higher the probability that he will inform himself about future pension 
payments. Astonishingly, the coefficients for females are insignificant when looking at the 
information level for the partner; the female dummy in the refusal regression is even signif-icantly 
negative. Since typically males are the financial officers25 in a household and typically have more 
complicated working histories which in turn make replacement rate calculation more complicated26, 
one would suspect their knowledge on their partner's replacement rates to be higher. This is not 
supported by the data. 
3.3.1 Pension level and pension age 
As Equation 2 implies, pension entry age and the replacement rate are positively interrelated, since 
the replacement, if adapted actuarially fair, is the degree of freedom parameter to equal retirement 
                                                          
22 Raising the pension entry age actually stabilizes the pension system and should induce more faith in the public 
pension system. The argument here works the other way around: if there is a necessity to cut benefits (in any form, like 
reducing the pension payment period by altering the entry age), one might begin to wonder how weak the system 
already is. 
23 The exact wording of the question was: "What percentage of your last wage/salary do you estimate your pension and 
your partner's pension will be?" 
24 with a negative influence on the 'don't know' and a positive influence on the 'refusal' probability. 
25 E.g. in about 75% of respondents claiming to be the household's financial officer are male in the GSOEP. 
26 Opposingly, one could argue that women's pensions levels are more difficult to calculate (effect of chid-raising 
allowance, incomplete work histories, low wages etc.), but the author favors the previous argument. 
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contributions and pension payments when the pension entry age is chosen. 
Table 6: Expectations for pension entry age and replacement rates by age 
 Men  Women 
Age Pension entry age Replacement rate   
Pension entry 
age 
Replacement 
rate 
under 30 63.6 51%  63.7 48% 
30-39 64 58%  62.7 52% 
40-49 63 59%  62.8 59% 
50-59 62.8 63%  62.9 62% 
60 and older 64.1 59%   63.2 62% 
Notes: Means for weighted values. Random sample 2003 only. Self-employed respondents were excluded. 
3.4 Private pensions 
This Section compares the ownership rates for private pensions between 2001 and 2003. 
 
Table 7: Ordered probit estimates: savings motives by time and pessimism 
   2001     2003   
  Men  Women   Men   Women 
Age Age Repl. rate Age Repl . rate Age Repl . rate Age Repl. rate 
under 30 62.7 59.7% 61.8 52. 9% 63.7 52 .4% 63.7 48.4% 
30-39 63.2 61.3% 61.6 60. 9% 64.0 58 .8% 62.8 52.7% 
40-49 62.5 61.8% 61.8 62. 0% 63.1 60 .7% 62.7 59.6% 
50-59 62.5 65.9% 61.4 61. 1% 63.0 63 .8% 62.8 61.4% 
60 and older 64.2 63.9% 63.2 61. 1% 64.1 59 .8% 63.1 61.6% 
Notes: Means for weighted values. Self-employed respondents were excluded. 
Table 8: Private pension ownership rates 
 2001  2003 
  N Percent   N Percent 
Private Pensions 297 16.53  529 20.4 
Occupational pensions ./.  285 10.99 
`Riester' pensions  ./.   122 4.7 
Other private pensions ./.  219 8.45 
Refusals 15 0.83   265 10.22 
Number of observations 1797  2593 
Note: Unweighted values. 
a Difference in question design: in 2003, private pensions were asked for each category separately, whereas in 2001, the 
question directly addressed to all forms of private pensions. 
b Observations differ from full sample (1829 obs.  in 2001 and 2667 in 2003) because of not returned drop-off parts. 
 
Table 8 lists descriptive findings of private pension ownership rates for 2001 and 2003. At first 
glance, the different rates for item nonresponse seem disturbing, but since the questioning was 
slightly more complex for 2003, this can easily explain the different rates. The ownership rate 
presented for 2003 therefore can be viewed as a lower bound for ownership, since the rate was 
calculated assuming the missing values to be zero. Just calculating the ratio for the values present 
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would raise it from 20.4% to 22.7%, and assuming all missing values were indeed respondents not 
willing to admit or not knowing the ownership, the ratio would rise to 30.6% as an upper bound. 
Table 17 shows probit regression results for private pension ownership. Again, the time effect 
is strongly significant: the ownership rates rose between 2001 and 2003. 
Table 18 depicts probit estimation results for the three second pillar pension types the SAVE 
questionnaire asks for. Income and age are significant for occupational pension schemes and other 
private old-age provisions, while income is insignificant for 'Riester'-type pensions -an interesting 
insight. Further, as already was pointed out by Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003), there is evidence 
for a relationship between households' self-assessment and actual behavior: the old-age provision 
motive is highly significant in any of the three regressions - the higher the rated importance of 
savings for old-age, the higher the probability to own any of the second pillar or two third pillar 
pension types. For the 'Riester'-type pensions, the motive to take advantage of state/tax subsidies is 
also highly significant. 
3.4.1 Private pensions: panel results 
Table 9 shows private pension ownership rates for households asked in 2001 and 2003. 
 
Table 9: Private pension ownership rates: panel results 
 2001 
2003 No Yes Refusals Total 
No 279 21 2 302 
 71.4% 31.8% 50.0% 65.5% 
Yes 91 39 1 131 
 23.3% 59.1% 25.0% 28.4% 
Refusals 21 6 1 28 
 5.4% 9.1% 25.0% 6.1% 
Total 391 66 4 461 
 
Private pension ownership more than doubled. This result has to be taken with caution, as already 
mentioned in Section 3.4, since the questionnaire has changed between both periods of time.27 
4 Risk behavior 
I now turn to topic remote to ones discussed in the two previous sections. In this section, I will 
present first empirical results for risk measures, which I will link to financial behavior. 
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Table 10: Risk assessment question 
"To what extent do the following statements apply to you. Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 
means 'does not apply at all' and 10 means 'applies very well'. I do not mind taking risks with respect 
to: 
1. My own health 
2. My career 
3. In money matters 
4. With respect to leisure time and sports 
5. When driving" 
 
The SAVE survey contains risk variables on five different domains: health, job, financial, leisure 
and sports, and when driving. Additionally, the SAVE 2005 sample will include questions for 
engaging on four different activities, followed by a judgement on how risky these activities are 
evaluated. In very recently received data28, these questions were already included to pretest their 
feasibility in the field. Moreover, the new risk engagement and evaluation questions allow a 
consistency test for the existing five risk domain questions. 
This section proceeds in the following way. First, I briefly summarize the sets of risk questions 
contained in SAVE and show descriptive and regression results for the newly added questions. 
Second, I describe the influence of risk measures on the financial behavior, mainly, on the portfolio 
composition. 
4.1 Risk variables in SAVE 
4.1.1 Risk assessment questions 
In order to allow to link savings behavior to risk, the SAVE survey contains risk questions common 
to all subsamples. The exact format of that question is shown in Table 10. 
Weber et al. (2002) distinguish between five content domains:29 Financial, health/safety, 
recreational, ethical and social decisions. Applying this scheme to the risk questions in SAVE, we 
see that the five direct risk questions distinguish between 3 content domains: (a) Health /Safety (1. 
+ 5.), (b) financial (3.)  and (c) recreational (4). Considering the results from Weber et al. (2002), 
the correlation coefficients between the risk domains would be positive, but significantly lower than 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
27 And since in 2003, the survey design was more detailed than in 2001, it is possible that this leads to overestimation, 
or, in 2001, to underestimation of private pensions rates, and thereby, pension wealth. 
28 The 2001 TPI subsample was surveyed again in June/July 2004; data were received by August 20, 2004. This panel 
panel sample contains 487 observations, which corresponds to a relatively high net percentage of 74% of the original 
660 observations from 2001. I will not refer to any other survey results except the risk questions in this paper. 
29 This bases on the work of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1986). 
 16
1.30 Table 11 shows that the highest correlation coefficient is 0.61 - well below 1. 
Table 11: Correlations between risk domains 
 Health Career Money matters Leisure and sports When driving 
Health 1     
Career 0.4852 1    
Money matters 0.4277 0.5211 1   
Leisure and sports 0.5061 0.5264 0.5419 1  
When driving 0.4418 0.4583 0.5001 0.6072 1 
Notes: N = 4476. Weighted values by income and age. 
Source: All SAVE subsamples 
The distributions of responses for the risk variables are shown in Figure 14, separately for each 
subsample. Two things are worth noting. First, the value 0 is used particularly often in respect of 
health, driving and investments, whereas 5 is fairly frequent for career and leisure/sport. Zero 
values are also given more frequently by the respondents in the Random Route subsample. Second, 
changes over time within subsamples, e.g. between the two times the TPI sample was surveyed, are 
very low, thus indicating a high stability of the answers. 
In Table 19 and Table 20, the results of Figure 14 are analyzed multi-dimensionally. In the 
2001 and 2004 TPI samples, respondents have a higher probability associating higher values to the 
risk-assessment than the respondents in the 2001 CAPI set for all risk categories. Freelancers and 
self-employed respondents describe themselves as showing more risky behavior in the fields of 
career and money matters, which coincidences with the widespread outlook for these two 
employment categories. Income variables are jointly significant for the risk categories money 
matters, leisure and sports, and when driving, but not for career and health categories. A higher 
schooling degree also raises the probability for higher risk values in four of the five categories. 
Still, one puzzling result is that civil servants do not describe themselves as being less risky in 
career matters. Women have an overall lower probability of associating high values to risk 
assessment. This is also in line with other findings from sociopsychological literature, cf. Slovic 
(1997). Age is jointly significant for all risk domains; age decreases the probability for high risk 
values. This means that older respondents, though not having to care for children, are more risk 
averse. 
Table 12: Risky activities 
"Four different activities are described below. What is the probability that you would do one of the 
following activities: 
1. Walking around alone in an unknown neighborhood 
2. Investing 5% of your yearly income in one stock 
                                                          
30 Simply spoken, this accounts for the fact that the preference for one risk domain is relatively offset by a less 
pronounced risk preference in a different domain. 
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3. Putting a day's income on a bet 
4. Go climbing" 
 
4.1.2 Risky activities 
It has been found in the psychological sciences that risk-taking is influenced by both, the 
characteristics of the decision-maker and by the situation (cf. Bromiley and Curley (1992)). The 
SAVE TPI 2004 subsample thus was enriched by additional questions: engaging on four different 
activities. The exact wording is shown in Table 12. The following two subsections present the 
results for these variables using the data from the SAVE TPI 2004 subsample; a more thorough 
analysis will be possible after the reception of the 2005 Random Route subsample data. 
This question is followed by the request to judge the riskiness of each of the listed activities on 
a scale from 0 to 10. The descriptive results are shown in Figure 15. It can be well seen that on 
average, risk evaluation and the probability for exercising the activity are negatively correlated, 
thus indicating that the questions were very well understood. Furthermore, and quite amazing, 
response rates are close to 100%. 
4.1.3 Interaction of both sets of risk variables 
The next step of analysis is to analyze the link between the two blocks of risk questions. This is 
done by regressing the probabilities of exercising each of the four activities on a set of respondent 
and household characteristics and the risk judgement of the corresponding activity, as well as the 
five abstract risk variables using an Ordered Probit regression model. The results, which are shown 
in Table 21, prove two things. First, the findings of Figure 15 that risk judgement and exercise are 
positively correlated also holds in a more differentiated framework: for each regression, the risk 
judgement associated with the risky activity is strongly negative significant. Second, for each 
activity, the risk assessment question corresponding to each risky activity is positively significant. 
A high self-assessed risk for leisure and sports raises the probability of walking alone through an 
unknown neighborhood, which is also true for money matters risk and investing 5 % of household 
income in one stock and for betting a day's income; risking more concerning own's health raises the 
probability of climbing. These results show that obviously the abstractness of the risk questions 
does not prevent respondents giving thoughtful and coherent answers. The next section will thus 
analyze the connection of risk assessment and financial behavior. 
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4.1.4 Lottery questions 
Before leaving this field, it might be interesting to take a look at a third set of risk attitude 
questions. In 2004 and 2005, SAVE contains so-called lottery questions. Lottery, or gamble 
questions, can be used to elicit individual value functions31, see Farquhar (1984), Abdellaoui 
(2000), Pennings and Smidts (2003), or Wakker and Deneffe (1996). While lottery questions are a 
relatively common tool in the economic literature to assess risk parameters, it is less common in the 
psychological literature in which risk is assessed by directly asking for certain situations/events. 
The risk associated with these situations then has to be evaluated by the respondent; see Weber et 
al. (2002). 
In the SAVE lottery questions, respondents are given a set of hypothetical choices where each 
choice is between a certain cash value and the toss of a coin when head pays a different value from 
tail. In the first three lottery questions, the value of a head draw increases from 1,700 to 2,000 and 
2,300 €, where tail pays nothing and the certain cash value is 1,000 €. In the second set of lottery 
questions, the certain cash value is 0, head brings a loss of 100 €, and the value of a tail draw 
changes from -150 to -200 and to -250 €.32 Figure 16 show the share of respondents choosing the 
toss of a coin when the expected value of the lottery is increased. Again, as with the risk activity 
questions, we see that values are consistent, since the fraction of respondents choosing the risky 
alternative rises when the incentives to do so are increased. The risky alternative choice is also 
more frequent for the second set of lotteries when payments are on a lower level, even if the the 
risky choice of the last question of the first set offers the highest gain over the certainty 
equivalence. Overall, the choice probabilities for the coin toss are relatively low given that, at least 
in the second set and partly in the first set, the choice of the uncertain alternative offers the higher 
expected value. 
Table 22 shows Probit and Ordered Probit regression results for the sets lottery questions. For 
the Ordered Probit case, the dependent variable was constructed in the following way. It takes on 
the value 0 if no lottery was chosen, 1 if only the lottery with the highest payoff, 2 if additionally 
the lottery with the second highest and 3 if the lottery with the lowest expected payoff was chosen. 
In most cases, respondents choosing lower expected value payoff lotteries also chose higher payoff 
lotteries. This can be seen by comparing the results from the Ordered Probit regression results with 
                                                          
31 Value functions assign subjective values to a stated (objective) value, cf. Schunk and Betsch (2004). 
32 This means that in the first set, a large number of repetitions would present the choice between 1,000 and 850, then 
1000 and 1000, then 1000 and 1150 €, while in the second set, the values are 0 and 25, 0 and 50, and 0 and 75 €. Risk 
neutral agents would simply compare these values and choose the alternative with the higher payments, while risk avers 
agents need to be reimbursed for the taken risks, and risk seeking agents are willing to pay for the chance of a higher 
gain. 
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the Binary Probit regressions33, which are very similar. A very interesting effect, again, is that the 
shown risk and lottery questions are reasonably connected. In Table 22, I included for all four 
regression types three risk variables dealing with monetary risk. This is the direct self-assessed 
general monetary risk questions, the probabilities of investing 5% of net income in a stock and for 
betting a day's income. The risky activity most directly connected to lotteries is betting. It is 
positively significant in all four regressions which means that respondents more willing to place 
money on a bet are also more likely to accept the lottery instead of the security equivalent. In the 
second set of lotteries, monetary risk taking also rises the probability of choosing the lottery. Nearly 
every other personal and household characteristic does not provide additional explanatory power. 
Of course, one might tend to argue that TPI sampled households are highly selective since they 
are used to those kinds of questions. This is not the entire truth. TPI comprises topics from market 
research, consumption and living habits, to political and personal attitudes to the knowledge about 
newest technologies. Additionally, in the case of the lottery and risk questions, the two set of 
questions were rather remote in the questionnaire; between the two blocks lie about 25 minutes of 
interview time,34 where the most complex interview part is in between. Even more surprising is the 
strong consistency of the data. 
Summarizing the results, the risk data are a promising base to work with. Skeptics might check 
the additional data when risk questions will be incorporated into the Random Route and CAPI panel 
subsamples in 2005. 
In the following subsection, I will investigate the interrelation between risk questions and 
portfolio compositions, controlling for personal and household characteristics. 
4.2 Risk and portfolio composition 
This section checks whether self-assessed risk affects financial behavior; I investigate this by 
using portfolio shares of financial wealth asset categories. 
4.2.1 Portfolios in SAVE 
In this paragraph, I will very quickly review the portfolio choice for SAVE 2001 and 2003. This 
work has been done prior to the arrival of the SAVE 2004 subsample. 
Figure 13 shows ownership rates for the six financial wealth categories. Ownership rates are 
                                                          
33 The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if any of the lotteries was chosen instead of the risk-free payoff and 0, 
otherweise. 
34 Compared with the interview time from CAPI interviews; TPI interview mode is P&P thus offering no time tracking. 
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comparable between subsample but for one item: stock ownership is more than twice as high for the 
TPI 2001 subsample compared to the RR 2003 sample, considering weighted values. The values are 
altogether higher than compared to the EVS for stock ownership. 
Figure 17 shows the portfolio shares of each financial category to total financial wealth.35 
Again, subsample effects are strong: The relative value of saving accounts is almost twice as high 
in the RR 2003 sample as in the TPI 2001 sample. This cannot be attributed to a low number of 
cases: the number of observations for conditional stock asset shares in the TPI sample is 160, as 
much as for the CAPI 2001 sample, and more than for the RR 2003 sample. Dividing Figure 17 into 
three age classes adds the insight that especially younger households in the TPI sample are more 
prone for stock holding, cf. Figure 18. 
4.2.2 Regression results 
I proceed in the following way. Since the additional risk and lottery questions are not available 
but for the TPI 2004 subsample, I limit the analysis to the set of risk questions present in all 
subsamples. This means that there is only one question connected to monetary behavior, which will 
be included in the analysis: self-assessed risk for money matters. Respondent were also given a 
question to what extent seven statements apply to them. I picked one of them, optimism36, which in 
several other analyses seemed to characterize households very well. 
Since not every household holds all financial wealth categories, an OLS approach would not 
account for this selectivity. I therefore apply the Heckman selection model. Finding the correct 
exclusion restrictions is not an easy task since most variables are very likely to affect both, asset 
ownership and the amount invested. Specification problems quickly lead to non-convergence of the 
ML-estimation of the selection model. I therefore apply a very slim specification for the regression 
stage which lead to convergence for all six asset categories.37 
The regression results are presented in Table 23 - Table 25.38 For the two most extreme asset 
categories39, saving accounts and stocks/fonds, the effects are very pronounced. Risk averse 
households have a higher probability for saving account ownership, and their portfolio share rises 
with risk aversion, as the negative significant coefficient for monetary risk indicates. For stocks and 
                                                          
35 As numbers might be difficult to retrieve, results are also depicted in Figure 26. 
36 One of the seven questions was also whether respondents were pessimistic. This statement is basically redundant, but 
was added as a plausibility check. The consistency of the response to the two contrary statements optimism and 
pessimism is very high. The response scale ranges from 0 to 10 for the statements, and, hence, the sum of the 
evaluations for optimism and pessimism should equal 10. 79% of respondents had this sum ranging from 8 to 12. 
37 This was a second order polynomial for net income and age, and the risk variable. 
38 I included the TPI 2004 panel for these regressions. 
39 in the sense of return risk 
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fonds, the opposite applies. The probability of ownership rises with risk preference, and also the 
relative amount of financial wealth invested in stocks. 
For the other four wealth categories, the effects are a little less clear. Bond ownership rises with 
risk preference, but not the portfolio share, which also applies to private old-age provisions.40 As 
for whole life insurances, risk preferences increases the ownership probability, but affects the 
portfolio share negatively. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper adds three branches to the investigation of Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003). The first 
one is whether a deterioration in households' contentment and confidence can be observed on a 
general level. While the judgement of the present and the past is comparable between 2001 and 
2003, the evaluations for future expectations became more pessimistic. This can be linked to a re-
evaluation of the savings motive for old-age, which became more important. 
The second checks whether this deterioration translates into one specific aspect for households' 
saving behavior: the old-age provision, namely the public pension system. I observe two things: the 
nonresponse and the 'don't know' level have fallen between 2001 and 2003. The political discussion 
thus might have been the catalyst to induce more individual concern for the respective pension 
situation. Second, a slight rise of the expected pension entry age and a drop in the expected pension 
level can be observed. This does not translate into an adaption of the evaluation of savings motives. 
Risk assessment theoretically seems a promising procedure when determining household 
financial behavior. The empirical implementation in SAVE was done including 5 risk questions 
covering 3 risk domains. Using the 'monetay risk' variable, I find significantly higher proba-bilities 
of stock ownership and portfolio shares. The opposite is true when looking at saving accounts. 
In addition to these results, I analyze the experimental risk questions included in SAVE 2004. In 
contrast to possibly sceptical objections to this kind of risk questions, these results prove two 
things. First, nonresponse is neglectably low. Considering the unusual character of these questions 
even for interview-skilled TPI respondents, this is a very positive result. Second, responses are 
sensible for both sets of risk questions, lotteries and risk assessments / risky activities. Risk 
assessment can be linked to financial behavior, as the regression results indicate. This is a 
promising base for further analysis concerning risk and portfolio choice. The SAVE 2005 samples 
will show whether the response quality level can be maintained for less interview skilled 
                                                          
40 In 2001, this category was asked less differentiated than in 2003 and 2004; I therefore summarize the three questions 
for private pensions from 2003 and 2004 in one category. 
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respondents. 
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Tables 
 
Table 13: Expected pension entry age 
 Coef.   P>t Coef.   P>t 
Net HH income / 10000 0.395   0.207 0.396   0.172 
(Net HH income) squared / 10000 0.000   0.363 0.000   0.309 
Age -0.074   0.054 -0.074   0.054 
Age squared 0.001   0.047 0.001   0.046 
Secondary school (D) 0.474   0.006 0.487   0.005 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.707   0.002 0.710   0.002 
University degree (D) 1.253   0.000 1.256   0.000 
Partner (D) -0.365   0.021 -0.394   0.014 
East Germany (D) 0.027   0.881 0.026   0.887 
Female (D) -0.724   0.000 -0.726   0.000 
Job: blue collar (D) 0.330   0.115 0.324   0.122 
Job: civil servant (D) -1.190   0.000 -1.188   0.000 
Job: freelancer (D) 1.271   0.006 1.285   0.006 
Job: self employed (D) 0.171   0.564 0.171   0.563 
Work parttime (D) 0.084   0.758 0.068   0.801 
Work little (D) 0.797   0.009 0.773   0.011 
Work not (D) 0.250   0.322 0.233   0.357 
Unemployed (D) -0.350   0.223 -0.345   0.229 
Village (D) -0.140   0.545 -0.119   0.608 
Year 2003 (D) 0.814   0.000     
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D)     -0.276   0.201 
Sample: Panel 2003 (D)     0.579   0.031 
Sample: RR 2003 (D)     0.647   0.003 
Constant 64.064   0.000 64.276   0.000 
Number of obs  2799   2799  
Prob > F  0.000   0.000  
R-squared  0.048   0.048  
Adj. R-squared  0.041   0.041  
Root MSE  3..496   3.496  
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Table 14: Probit regression results for nonresponse to the pension entry age 
  Respondent    Partner    
 Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > 
Net HH income/10' -0.163 0.415 -0.1630.41 0.593 -0.294 0.177 -0.292 0.18 -0.620 0.01
Net HH income/10' sq. 0.053 0.0640 0.041 0.064 0.064 0.125 0.064 0.12 0.112 0.02
Age/10 -0.443 0.010 -0.469 0.006 -0.820 0.000 -0.827 0.000 -0.912 0.00
Age/10 squared 0.060 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.107 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.121 0.00
Secondary school (D) -0.148 0.098 -0.178 0.044 -0.050 0.568 -0.053 0.54 -0.014 0.88
Graduation diploma (D) -0.265 0.033 -0.262 0.033 -0.275 0.036 -0.280 0.032 -0.276 0.07
University degree (D) -0.093 0.441 -0.092 0.441- 30.441 0.737 -0.09 0.737 0.006 0.96
Partner (D) 0.116 0.194 0.166 0.056       
East Germany (D) -0.104 0.308 -0.110 0.278 -0.259 0.015 -0.262 0.014 -0.294 0.01
Female (D) 0.107 0.227 0.129 0.141 -0.359 0.000 -0.350 0.000 -0.779 0.00
Job: blue collar (D) 0.038 0.732 0.058 0.598 -0.110 0.336 -0.107 0.34 -0.170 0.20
Job: civil servant (D) -0.117 0.478 -0.121 0.459 -0.207 0.193 -0.208 0.22 -0.222 0.23
Job: freelancer (D) -0.031 0.902 -0.059 0.815 -0.676 0.072 -0.678 0.07 -0.694 0.10
Job: self-employed (D)     -0.260 0.132 -0.256 0.137 -0.533 0.01
Work parttime (D) -0.059 0.691 -0.034 0.817 -0.358 0.065 -0.351 0.069 -0.218 0.36
Work little (D) 0.160 0.291 0.398 0.187 -0.022 0.016 -0.016 0.92 0.152 0.39
Work not (D) 0.473 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.317 0.004 0.321 0.003 0.398 0.00
Unemployed (D) -0.362 0.011 -0.362 0.011 -0.301 0.053 -0.292 0.059 -0.400 0.02
Village (D) -0.110 0.410 -0.152 0.249 0.036 0.761 0.033 0.78 0.030 0.82
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) -0.290 0.004   -0.004 0.966 -0.072 0.37   
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) -1.047 0.000   -0.145 0.292 0.625 0.153   
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.524 0.000   -0.053 0.606     
Year 2003 (D)   -0.424 0.000 0.613 0.167   0.096 0.31
Refusal respondent(D)         2.434 0.00
Constant -0.327 0.403 -0.494 0.193 0.613 0.167 0.625 0.15 0.477 0.34
Number of obs 2879 2879 2250 2250 2250 
LR chi2 129.1 110.73 274.81 274.24 704.71 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R squared 0.076 0.066 0.141 0.141 0.362 
Log likelihood -780.487 -789.6772 -835.104 -835.387 -620.155 
Notes: Observations were excluded if partner was retired or self-employed. 
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Table 15: Probit regression results for ‘don’t know’ and refusals for own pension replacement rates 
Don't´Know Refusal Don't Know or Refusal
Coef P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > Coeff. P > z Coeff. P >
Net HH income/10' - 0.038 -0.213 0.03 0.008 0.968 0.126 0.53 -0.210 0.033 -0.203 0.0
Net HH income/10' 0.020 0.157 0.021 0.13 -0.015 0.734 -0.040 0.40 0.017 0.227 0.016 0.2
Age/10 0.247 0.102 0.245 0.10 -0.575 0.000 -0.563 0.00 -0.244 0.079 -0.241 0.0
Age/10 squared - 0.006 -0.048 0.00 0.080 0.000 0.078 0.00 0.018 0.273 0.017 0.2
Secondary school - 0.136 -0.088 0.15 30.136 0.246 -0.119 0.14 -0.137 0.029 -0.142 0.0
Graduation - 0.048 -0.167 0.04 -0.134 0.234 -0.121 0.27 -0.225 0.008 -0.224 0.0
University degree - 0.118 -0.136 0.11 -0.204 0.084 -0.211 0.07 -0.220 0.010 -0.219 0.0
Partner (D) 0.030 0.599 0.015 0.79 -0.228 0.004 -0.148 0.05 -0.060 0.296 -0.042 0.4
East Germany (D) 0.028 0.675 0.029 0.66 0.059 0.511 0.057 0.04 0.046 0.487 0.045 0.4
Female (D) 0.134 0.031 0.131 0.03 0.135 0.097 0.144 0.07 0.194 0.002 0.196 0.0
Job:  blue collar (D) - 0.1190 -0.122 0.11 0.085 0.0 0.103 0.31 -0.084 0.256 -0.080 0.2
Job:   civil servant - 0.000 -0.599 0.00 -0.050 0.746 -0.060 0.69 -0.543 0.000 -0.544 0.0
Job:   freelancer (D) 0.193 0.242 0.197 0.23 0.250 0.627 0.099 0.11 0.115 0.115 0.250 0.1
Job:   self employed      
Work parttime (D) 0.164 0.092 0.160 0.09 0.011 0.936 0.020 0.88 0.163 0.093 0.167 0.0
Work little (D) 0.166 0.117 0.158 0.13 0.326 0.016 0.356 0.00 0.326 0.003 0.334 0.0
Work not (D) 0.252 0.005 0.248 0.00 0.495 0.000 0.507 0.00 0.538 0.000 0.543 0.0
Unemployed (D) 0.020 0.845 0.020 0.84 -0.248 0.051 -0.241 0.05 -0.155 0.143 -0.155 0.1
Village (D) - 0.511 -0.047 0.58 30.276 0.06 -0.06 0.33 -0.081 0.346 -0.093 0.2
Sample:   CAPI 0.113 0.149  -0.524 0.000 -0.136 0.077 
Sample:   Panel 0.034 0.730  -0.617 0.000 -0.244 0.012 
Sample:   RR 2003 - 0.964  -0.417 0.000 -0.209 0.006 
Year 2003 (D)   -0.068 0.21 -0.133 0.07   -0.130 0.0
Constant - 0.291 -0.249 0.42 0.079 0.828 -0.326 0.35 0.978 0.001 0.872 0.0
Number of obs 2835 283 283 2835 283 2835
LR chi2 181.16 178.88 126.78 97.84 242.76 239.4
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00  0.00
Pseudo-R squared 0.047 0.046 0.065 0.062 0.06  0.06
Log likelihood -1835.521 -1836.659 -917.202 -931.671 -1839.564 -1841.207
Notes: Observations were excluded if respondent was retired or self-employed. 
 
Table 16: Probit regression results for ‘don’t know’ and refusals for partner’s pension replacement rates 
Don't Know Refusal Don't Know or Refusal
Coef P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P >
Net HH income/10' - 0.002 -0.569 0.00 -0.118 0.60 -0.054 0.81 -0.625 0.00 -0.597 0.0
Net HH income/10' 0.086 0.018 0.085 0.01 0.031 0.48 0.018 0.69 0.100 0.00 0.094 0.0
Age/10 - 0.753 -0.054 0.76 -0.472 0.02 -0.451 0.03 -0.394 0.03 -0.385 0.0
Age/10 sq. 0.00 0.981 -0.001 0.96 0.066 0.00 0.063 0.00 0.045 0.03 0.044 0.0
Secondary school - 0.680 -0.032 0.66 -0.095 0.25 -0.09 0.25 -0.087 0.25 80.198 0.1
Graduation - 0.310 -0.105 0.31 - 0.44 -0.095 0.47 -0.164 0.12 -0.165 0.1
University degree 0.023 0.820 0.023 0.82 -0.361 0.00 -0.354 0.01 -0.159 0.12 -0.156 0.1
East Germany (D) - 0.848 -0.016 0.84 -0.070 0.04 -0.072 0.51 -0.048 0.56 -0.051 0.5
Female (D) 0.009 0.912 0.008 0.91 -0.097 0.35 -0.078 0.44 -0.041 0.61 -0.033 0.6
Job:  blue collar (D) - 0.209 00.20 0.21 0.025 0.22 0.098 070 -0.107 0.09 80.268 0.2
Job:   civil servant - 0.259 00.25 0.26 0.1290 0.12 0.031 0.14 00.259 0.80 -0.031 0.7
Job:   freelancer (D) - 0.225 -0.260 0.22 -0.031 0.91 -0.088 0.76 80.225 0.21 -0.275 0.1
Work parttime (D) 0.103 0.381 0.103 0.37 -0.090 0.58 -0.073 0.65 0.5 0.58 0.078 0.5
Work little (D) - 0.311 - 0.13 0.053 0.75 0.088 0.60 10.4 0.39 -0.091 0.4
Work not (D) - 0.388 -0.095 0.38 0.230 0.10 0.245 0.08 0.030 0.79 0.040 0.7
Unemployed (D) 0.104 0.426 0.3 0.42 0.120 0.94 0.3 0.93 0.119 0.37 0.120 0.3
Village (D) - 0.011 -0.267 0.00 0.131 0.13 0.089 0.48 -0.187 0.06 -0.211 0.0
Sample:   CAPI - 0.612  -0.384 0.00 -0.240 0.00  
Sample:   Panel - 0.358  -0.350 0.02 -0.286 0.01  
Sample:   RR 2003 - 0.174  -0.218 0.04 -0.233 0.00  
Year 2003 (D)   -0.092 0.18 -0.053 0.55  -0.113 0.1
Constant 0.599 0.136 0.568 0.15 -0.091 0.85 -0.348 0.46 1.664 0.00 1.503 0.0
Number of obs 1922 192 192 192 192 192
LR chi2  38.67 38.3 51.6 39.0 53.4  45.7
Prob > F  0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Pseudo-R squard  .0145 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02  0.01
Log likelihood = -1312.436 -1312.573 -695.871 -702.207 -1255.600 -1259.466
Notes: Observations were excluded if partner was retired or self-employed. 
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Table 17: Probit regression results for private pension ownership 
 Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z 
Net HH income/10' 0.310 0.050 0.288 0.069 
Net HH income/10' sq. -0.082 0.033 -0.075 0.050 
Age/10 0.533 0.000 0.515 0.000 
Age/10 squared -0.066 0.000 -0.064 0.000 
Secondary school (D) 0.123 0.051 0.126 0.046 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.285 0.001 0.277 0.001 
University degree (D) 0.252 0.002 0.256 0.002 
Partner (D) 0.161 0.007 0.142 0.018 
East Germany (D) -0.016 0.804 -0.015 0.820 
Female (D) -0.030 0.606 -0.020 0.729 
Job: blue collar (D) -0.114 0.162 -0.115 0.157 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.389 0.001 -0.386 0.001 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.293 0.080 0.293 0.081 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.503 0.000 0.513 0.000 
Work parttime (D) -0.039 0.706 -0.038 0.709 
Work little (D) -0.415 0.000 -0.419 0.000 
Work not (D) -0.446 0.000 -0.443 0.000 
Unemployed (D) 0.010 0.926 0.012 0.916 
Village (D) 0.200 0.013 0.213 0.008 
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D)   -0.231 0.003 
Sample: Panel 2003 (D)   0.426 0.000 
Sample: RR 2003 (D)   0.324 0.000 
Year 2003 (D) 0.492 0.000   
Constant -2.203 0.000 -2.008 0.000 
Number of obs  3894 3894  
LR chi2  398.84 409.23  
Prob > F  0.000 0.000  
Pseudo-R squared  0.102 0.105  
Log likelihood  -1748.039 -1742.840  
Notes: A t-test showed that the hypothesis of equality of the two 2003 subsample dummies could not be rejected. 
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Table 18: Probit regression results for ownership of different private pension types 
 Occ. pensionsa 'Riester' pensions Other old-age provisions 
 Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P> z Coeff. P >  z  
Net HH income/10' 0.540 0.023 0.235 0.765 1.092 0.083 
Net HH income/10' sq. -0.115 0.043 -0.399 0.505 -0.852 0.070 
Age/10 0.549 0.001 0.763 0.008 0.437 0.032 
Age/10 squared -0.050 0.003 -0.099 0.002 -0.062 0.005 
Secondary school (D) 0.121 0.224 0.254 0.049 -0.092 0.398 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.394 0.005 0.282 0.102 0.115 0.413 
University degree (D) 0.312 0.016 0.192 0.285 0.252 0.060 
Partner (D) 0.135 0.147 0.235 0.073 -0.057 0.577 
East Germany (D) -0.558 0.000 0.241 0.057 0.109 0.309 
Female (D) -0.020 0.825 0.013 0.914 -0.085 0.366 
Job: blue collar (D) -0.161 0.221 0.228 0.189 -0.176 0.235 
Job: civil servant (D)   0.057 0.813 -0.086 0.649 
Job: freelancer (D)     0.574 0.031 
Job: self-employed (D)   0.165 0.468 0.747 0.000 
Work parttime (D) -0.285 0.050 0.196 0.304 -0.031 0.846 
Work little (D) -0.557 0.001 -0.054 0.815 -0.372 0.064 
Work not (D) -0.694 0.000 0.059 0.729 -0.266 0.051 
Unemployed (D) -0.526 0.023 0.237 0.206 -0.107 0.551 
Village (D) 0.267 0.047 0.089 0.598 0.079 0.576 
Saving Reason: State subsidies   0.053 0.000   
Saving Reason: Old-age provision 0.027 0.038 0.046 0.019 0.072 0.000 
Constant -2.563 0.000 -3.982 0.000 -2.473 0.000 
Number of obs 2002 2158  2209 
LR chi2 190.65 116.21  209.74 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Pseudo-R squared 0.129 0.131  0.152 
Log likelihood -646.715 -385.181  -582.202 
a Self-employed, civil servants and freelancers were excluded from the regression. 
 30
 
Table 19: Ordered probit regressions: self-assessed risk: health, career, money matters 
 Health Career Money matters 
 Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z
Net income / 10,0000 0.106 0.730 0.124 0.687 0.736 0.016
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.105 0.0 -0.067 0.823 -0.365 0.215
Age / 10 0.726 0.000 0.704 0.000 0.583 0.000
Age / 10 sq. -0.053 0.000 -0.055 0.000 -0.075 0.000
Secondary school (D) 0.004 0.919 0.061 0.147 0.067 0.107
Graduation diploma (D) 0.018 0.757 0.153 0.009 0.273 0.000
University degree (D) -0.040 0.449 0.143 0.009 0.214 0.000
Kids (D) -0.008 0.892 0.005 0.930 -0.145 0.013 
Kids living in same house (D) 0.050 0.285 0.042 0.388 0.061 0.204 
Job: blue collar (D) 0.046 0.408 -0.087 0.121 -0.127 0.026 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.072 0.357 -0.018 0.813 0.113 0.145 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.158 0.215 0.552 0.000 0.273 0.031 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.101 0.204 0.374 0.000 0.287 0.000 
Retired (D) -0.023 0.779 -0.368 0.000 -0.054 0.516 
Work parttime (D) 0.014 0.853 0.116 0.030 -0.030 0.688 
Work little (D) 0.120 0.115 0.116 0.137 0.900 0.900 
Work not (D) -0.068 0.319 -0.264 0.000 -0.180 0.010 
Unemployed (D) -0.014 0.866 0.213 0.012 -0.074 0.382 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.146 0.002 0.128 0.007 0.014 0.772 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.047 0.385 70.385 0.536 0.033 0.544 
Partner (D) -0.024 0.661 0.010 0.865 0.055 0.321 
Separated or divorced (D) 0.217 0.001 0.140 0.035 0.162 0.013 
Widowed (D) 0.158 0.019 0.117 0.091 0.145 0.036 
Female (D) -0.258 0.000 -0.304 0.000 -0.407 0.000 
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.230 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.190 0.001 
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.009 0.891 -0.046 0.496 0.030 0.651
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.055 0.264 0.149 0.004 0.027 0.592
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) 0.266 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.119 0.066
Number of obs 4516 4176 4483
LR chi2(29) 290.51  727.77  636.18  
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.0161  0.0416  0.0373  
Log likelihood -8896.788 -8379.676 -8214.139 
F-Test income variables 0.940  0.863  0.003  
F-Test age variables 0.001  0.0010  0.001  
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'does not apply at all' and 10 'does fully apply'. The 
wording of the questions is shown in Table 10. 
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Table 20: Ordered probit regressions: self-assessed risk: leisure and sports, when driving 
 Leisure and sports When driving 
 Coeff.  P> z Coeff. P> z
Net income / 10,000 0.552  0.071 0.637 0.039
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.274  0.363 -0.420 0.160
Age / 10 -0.201  0.012 -0.171 0.046
Age / 10 sq. 0.001  0.932 0.003 0.721
Secondary school (D) 0.030  0.461 0.121 0.004
Graduation diploma (D) 0.175  0.002 0.187 0.001
University degree (D) 0.138  0.008 0.140 0.010
Kids (D) 0.001  0.984 -0.079 0.185
Kids living in same house (D) -0.012  0.797 0.022 0.653
Job: blue collar (D) 0.016  0.776 -0.017 0.762
Job: civil servant (D) 0.060  0.435 -0.105 0.179
Job: freelancer (D) 0.201  0.112 0.054 0.674
Job: self-employed (D) 0.084  0.287 0.109 0.169
Retired (D) 0.013  0.870 0.036 0.671
Work parttime (D) 0.061  0.398 -0.059 0.432
Work little (D) 0.124  0.1020 -0.102 0.198
Work not (D) -0.156  0.021 -0.274 0.000
Unemployed (D) -0.002  0.982 0.007 0.932
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.096  0.037 0.066 0.164
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.120  0.025 -0.045 0.419
Partner (D) -0.023  0.677 0.010 0.866
Separated or divorced (D) 0.093  0.150 0.191 0.004
Widowed (D) 0.130  0.054 0.004 0.949
Female (D) -0.385  0.000 -0.446 0.000
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.318  0.000 0.094 0.098
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.062  0.335 -0.069 0.299
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.113  0.021 0.042 0.401
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) 0.357  0.000 0.235 0.000
Number of obs  4477  4364  
LR chi2(29)  786.13  603.74  
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2  0.0416  0.0359  
Log likelihood  -9062.239  -8110.990  
F-Test income variables  0.030  0.056  
F-Test age variables  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'does not apply at all' and 10 'does fully apply'. The 
wording of the questions is shown in Table 10. 
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Table 21: Ordered probit regressions: exercising risky activities 
 Walk alone at night 5% in stocks Bet a day's inc. Climbing 
 Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z  
Net income / 10,000 -0.852 0.269 1.893 0.015 2.668 0.002 2.786 0.002 
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.323 0.402 -0.726 0.063 -1.117 0.016 -1.206 0.006 
Age / 10 0.790 0.101 0.072 0.884 -0.218 0.679 0.296 0.606 
Age / 10 sq. -0.090 0.077 -0.023 0 .90  0.007 0.907 -0.069 0.266 
Secondary school (D) 0.276 0.037 0.292 0.031 0.269 0.068 0.287 0.066 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.303 0.091 0.343 0.062 0.148 0.453 0.021 0.919 
University degree (D) 0.142 0.409 0.259 0 .51 -0.125 0.515 -0.048 0.817 
Kids (D) 0.368 0.076 0.1440 0.515 0.244 0.288 0.144 0.554 
Kids living in same house (D) -0.050 0.741 0.134 0.391 -0.101 0.549 -0.027 0.882 
Job: blue collar (D) 0.000 0.999 0.023 0 . 0  -0.049 0.802 0.302 0.124 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.067 0.771 -0.060 0.801 0.035 0.887 0.136 0.613 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.894 0.091 -0.350 0.504 -0.617 0.282 -0.641 0.295 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.222 0.346 0.118 0.613 0.567 0.017 -0.195 0.471 
Retired (D) -0.102 0.733 10.2 0.451 0.070 0.378 0.070 0.843 
Work parttime (D) 0.058 0.812 -0.182 0.445 0.485 0.054 0.244 0.362 
Work little (D) -0.140 0.603 0.316 0.217 0.071 0.801 -0.143 0.637 
Work not (D) 0.074 0.784 0.404 0.118 -0.001 0.996 0.278 0.374 
Unemployed (D) -0.016 0.958 -0.504 0.102 0.95 0.782 -0.235 0.531 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.007 0.962 0.111 0.448 0.036 0.819 -0.035 0.835 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.027 0.884 0.026 0.892 -0.146 0.0230 0.023 0.920 
Partner (D) 0.077 0.775 0.635 0.025 -0.205 0.487 0.361 0.268 
Separated or divorced (D) -0.009 0.973 0.446 0.102 -0.260 0.382 -0.314 0.306 
Widowed (D) 0.243 0.392 0.568 0.1590 0.348 0.242 0.159 0.619 
Female (D) -0.861 0.000 -0.180 0.248 -0.140 0.418 -0.105 0.573 
Risk judgement of act. -0.247 0.000 -0.171 0.000 -0.179 0.000 -0.225 0.000 
Risk: health 0.013 0.596 -0.033 0.179 0.003 0.922 0.020 0.476 
Risk: career 0.016 0.512 0.008 0.759 0.017 0.541 0.016 0.567 
Risk: money matters -0.014 0.610 0.147 0.000 0.115 0.000 -0.075 0.022 
Risk: leisure and sports 0.048 0.064 0.011 0.686 0.022 0.459 0.176 0.000 
Risk: driving 0.016 0.520 -0.013 0.608 0.054 0.052 0.031 0.308 
Number of obs 434 432 433 434 
LR chi2(29) 300.79 178.08 191.32 229.23 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1524 0.102 0.1334 0.1649 
Log likelihood -836.62743 -783.98228 -621.18513 -580.62361 
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'does not apply at all' and 10 'does fully apply'. The 
wording of the questions is shown in Table 12. 
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Table 22: Ordered probit and probit regressions: lottery questions 
  Lottery set 1   Lottery set 2  
 Ordered probit reg. probit reg. Ordered probit reg. Probit reg. 
 Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z Coeff. P> z 
Net income / 0.056 0.981 0.065 0.9810 0.078 0.971 0.110 0.960 
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.504 0.855 0.197 0.950 2.161 0.441 1.790 0.547 
Age / 10 0.751 0.435 0.666 0.509 -0.405 0.504 -0.365 0.555 
Age / 10 sq. -0.101 0.345 -0.092 0.409 0.052 0.419 0.051 0.435 
Secondary school (D) 0.159 0.503 0.239 0.339 0.052 0.766 0.101 0.562 
Graduation diploma (D) -0.104 0.741 0.032 0.921 -0.441 0.070 -0.390 0.115 
University degree (D) 0.156 0.615 0.351 0.278 0.045 0.834 0.116 0.604 
Kids (D) -0.185 0.577 -0.348 0.322 -0.355 0.188 -0.370 0.177 
Kids living in same house (D) -0.199 0.475 -0.099 0.738 0.0510 0.959 -0.051 0.794 
Job: blue collar (D) 0.184 0.507 0.304 0.305 0.446 0.049 0.445 0.059 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.506 0.297 60.297 0.197 -0.251 0.446 -0.286 0.406 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.227 0.782 0.439 0.614 -0.210 0.788 -0.114 0.870 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.083 0.802 0.115 0.744 0.187 0.508 0.169 0.573 
Retired (D) -0.384 0.509 -0.311 0.605 -0.482 0.199 -0.618 0.107 
Work parttime (D) 0.119 0.768 0.012 0.976 -0.427 0.221 -0.368 0.281 
Work little (D) 0.093 0.844 0.129 0.788 0.647 0.041 0.821 0.013 
Work not (D) 0.255 0.584 0.257 0.3580 0.358 0.261 0.451 0.174 
Unemployed (D) -0.976 0.127 -1.145 0.3110 -0.311 0.417 -0.423 0.284 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.177 0.460 -0.087 0.728 -0.198 0.294 -0.190 0.334 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) 0.379 0.238 0.428 0.4280 0.144 0.154 0.364 0.144 
Partner (D) -0.081 0.846 -0.088 0.846 -0.131 0.710 -0.239 0.502 
Separated or divorced (D) 0.105 0.813 0.063 0.896 0.470 0.167 0.520 0.136 
Widowed (D) 0.109 0.781 0.7810 0.673 -0.177 0.643 -0.100 0.793 
Female (D) -0.312 0.275 -0.242 0.406 0.180 0.359 0.269 0.181 
Risk: money matters 0.002 0.960 -0.008 0.868 0.093 0.003 0.106 0.002 
Risky act.: invest 5% in stocks 0.054 0.107 0.075 0.036 -0.029 0.272 -0.019 0.491 
Risky act.: bet a day's inc. 0.169 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.080 0.007 0.092 0.004 
Constant   -2.637 0.253   -0.286 0.849 
Number of obs 434 434 427 435 
LR chi2(29) 82.25 84.32 54.14 64.11 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1945 0.265 0.078 0.1246 
Log likelihood -170.301 -116.925 -319.951 -225.121 
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Table 23: Portfolio shares: saving accounts and building society contracts. Heckman selection regression 
 Saving  accounts Buiding society contracts 
 Regression stage Selection stage Regression stage    Selection stage 
 Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z Coeff. P > z      Coeff. P >  z  
Net income / 10,000 -0.375 0.011 1.883 0.000 1.229 0.000       2.493 0.000 
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.159 0.246 -1.310 0.00 -1.100 0.000      -2.140 0.000
Age / 10 -0.199 0.000 -0.055 0.63 0.154 0.038       0.500 0.000
Age / 10 sq. 0.026 0.000 0.018 0.11
4
-0.023 0.002      -0.063 0.000
Secondary school (D)    0.119 0.04   0.056 0.036
Graduation diploma (D)    0.192 0.03   0.099 0.025
University degree (D)    0.035 0.66   0.113 0.002
Kids (D)    -0.005 0.95   0.032 0.383
Kids living in same house (D)    -0.145 0.03   -0.003 0.917
Job: blue collar (D)    -0.057 0.49   0.070 0.055
Job: civil servant (D)    0.188 0.13   0.051 0.264
Job: freelancer (D)    -0.161 0.41   -0.063 0.389
Job: self-employed (D)    -0.347 0.00
8
  -0.008 0.884
Retired (D)    0.180 0.12   0.006 0.910
Work parttime (D)    -0.338 0.00   -0.003 0.949
Work little (D)    -0.328 0.00   0.000 0.999
Work not (D)    -0.352 0.00
1
  0.040 0.469
Unemployed (D)    -0.171 0.15   -0.054 0.456
Unemp.> 1 month (D)    0.129 0.07   0.032 0.301
Unemp.> 6 months (D)    -0.190 0.01   -0.039 0.260
Partner (D)    0.167 0.03   0.036 0.382
Separated or divorced (D)    -0.190 0.04   -0.024 0.650
Widowed (D)    -0.042 0.68   0.093 0.064
Female (D)    0.075 0.19   0.010 0.765
Exp.: Germany's ec. developm    -0.006 0.64
7
  0.004 0.511
Exp.: own ec. developm.    0.085 0.00   0.019 0.004
Sample: TPI 2001 (D)    0.195 0.02   0.136 0.001
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D)    -0.096 0.31   0.096 0.045
Sample: RR 2003 (D)    -0.292 0.00   0.063 0.070
Sample: TPI 2004 (D)    0.011 0.91   0.179 0.000
Self-assess: optimist    -0.008 0.45   -0.005 0.378
Risk: money matters -0.027 0.000 -0.021 0.05
9
-0.003 0.624       -0.001 0.960
Constant 0.879 0.000 -0.500 0.12 -0.682 0.000       -2.248 0.000
Number of obs   2755    2755  
Uncensored obs   1641    701  
Prob > chi2   0.000    0.000  
Log likelihood   -2168.966    -1474.937  
Rho   0.628    0.997  
Sigma   0.379    0.566  
Lambda   0.238    0.564  
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Table 24: Portfolio shares: whole life insurances and private old age provisions. Heckman selection regression 
 Whole life insurances Private old age provisions 
 Regression stage     Selectionstage Regression stage    Selection stage 
 Coeff. P > z       Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P > z      Coeff. P >  z
Net income / 10,000 0.031 0.859        1.777 0.000 -0.870 0.000      1.420 0.028
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.078 0.554       -0.897 0.042 0.511 0.013       -0.947 0.104
Age / 10 0.336 0.000        0.952 0.000 0.354 0.004       0.876 0.000
Age / 10 sq. -0.035 0.000       -0.107 0.000 -0.037 0.008      -0.106 0.000
Secondary school (D)   0.190 0.005   0.060 0.500
Graduation diploma (D)   0.104 0.293   0.207 0.090
University degree (D)   0.108 0.232   0.253 0.027
Kids (D)   -0.004 0.965   -0.118 0.364
Kids living in same house (D)   0.033 0.687   0.042 0.693
Job: blue collar (D)   -0.066 0.473   0.041 0.713
Job: civil servant (D)   -0.025 0.841   -0.344 0.035
Job: freelancer (D)   0.182 0.383   0.255 0.285
Job: self-employed (D)   0.083 0.542   0.588 0.000
Retired (D)   0.115 0.409   -0.164 0.412
Work parttime (D)   -0.096 0.443   0.001 0.992
Work little (D)   -0.112 0.416   -0.235 0.192
Work not (D)   -0.227 0.060   -0.200 0.199
Unemployed (D)   -0.184 0.228   0.226 0.210
Unemp.> 1 month (D)   0.142 0.076   0.037 0.712
Unemp.> 6 months (D)   -0.163 0.076   0.044 0.710
Partner (D)   0.155 0.108   -0.112 0.391
Separated or divorced (D)   -0.073 0.503   -0.295 0.056
Widowed (D)   -0.246 0.041   -0.078 0.605
Female (D)   -0.055 0.434   -0.068 0.455
Exp.: Germany's ec. developm   0.005 0.745   0.010 0.600
Exp.: own ec. developm.   0.075 0.000   0.020 0.301
Sample: TPI 2001 (D)   0.237 0.008   0.011 0.437
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D)   0.016 0.878   0.000 0.982
Sample: RR 2003 (D)   -0.162 0.055   0.244 0.040
Sample: TPI 2004 (D)   -0.074 0.520   0.581 0.000
Self-assess: optimist   -0.003 0.804   0.256 0.023
Risk: money matters -0.013 0.002        0.016 0.174 0.006 0.375       0.761 0.000
Constant -0.263 0.245        -3.345 0.000 -0.419 0.186       -3.474 0.000
Number of obs   2755    2755  
Uncensored obs   790    289  
Prob > chi2   0.000    0.000  
Log likelihood   -1477.699    Twostep  
Rho   0.3687    0.2984  
Sigma   0.2924    0.2769  
Lambda   0.1078    0.0826  
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Table 25: Portfolio shares: bonds and stocks, fonds. Heckman selection regression 
 Bonds Fonds, Stocks 
 Regression stage     Selection stage Regression stage    Selection stage 
 Coeff. P > z       Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P > z       Coeff. P >  z  
Net income / 10,000 -0.200 0.360         1.046 0.103 0.098 0.632        2.181 0.000
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.043 0.739         0.005 0.993 -0.111 0.438       -0.918 0.064
Age / 10 -0.110 0.150         0.366 0.058 -0.106 0.124       0.385 0.019
Age / 10 sq. 0.013 0.071         -0.023 0.235 0.013 0.072       -0.029 0.081
Secondary school (D)   0.202 0.042  0.322 0.000
Graduation diploma (D)   0.159 0.277  0.397 0.000
University degree (D)   0.313 0.007  0.442 0.000
Kids (D)   -0.063 0.656  -0.151 0.179
Kids living in same house (D)   -0.108 0.349  -0.016 0.859
Job: blue collar (D)   -0.115 0.421  -0.099 0.362
Job: civil servant (D)   -0.160 0.361  -0.120 0.370
Job: freelancer (D)   -0.057 0.845  0.227 0.308
Job: self-employed (D)   0.039 0.830  0.011 0.942
Retired (D)   -0.017 0.930  -0.109 0.489
Work parttime (D)   -0.194 0.325  0.139 0.330
Work little (D)   -0.219 0.289  -0.034 0.829
Work not (D)   0.021 0.905  0.013 0.923
Unemployed (D)   -0.158 0.512  -0.030 0.869
Unemp.> 1 month (D)   -0.223 0.071  0.084 0.341
Unemp.> 6 months (D)   0.224 0.119  -0.252 0.020
Partner (D)   0.099 0.436  0.168 0.127
Separated or divorced (D)   -0.252 0.130  -0.058 0.664
Widowed (D)   0.082 0.627  0.096 0.502
Female (D)   0.083 0.388  0.004 0.959
Exp.: Germany's ec. developm   -0.008 0.665  0.025 0.123
Exp.: own ec. developm.   0.083 0.000  0.084 0.000
Sample: TPI 2001 (D)   0.068 0.599  0.562 0.000
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D)   0.111 0.432  0.066 0.593
Sample: RR 2003 (D)   -0.176 0.129  -0.027 0.782
Sample: TPI 2004 (D)   -0.199 0.224  0.473 0.000
Self-assess: optimist   0.011 0.550  -0.015 0.324
Risk: money matters -0.013 0.189         0.067 0.000 0.020 0.010       0.127 0.000
Constant 0.665 0.082         -3.653 0.000 0.426 0.064       -3.649 0.000
Number of obs   2755   2755  
Uncensored obs   232   548  
Prob > chi2   0.007   0.002  
Log likelihood   -679.936   -1170.428  
Rho   -0.024   0.176  
Sigma   0.234   0.302  
Lambda   -0.006   0.053  
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Table 26: Financial wealth allocations by subsamples and income 
  TPI 
2001 
  CAPI 
2001
  CAPI 
2003
  RR 
2003
 
 Own
a
inc.b PF 
h
Own. inc. PFsh. Own. inc. PF 
h
Own. inc. PFs
hN c 657  324 1125 576 462 208 1973  773
Saving 71.2 2128.4 33.4% 70.8% 2247.0 48.7% 62.1% 2357.8 48.9% 58.9% 2754.2 57.4
accounts 467  264 797 481 287 170 1162  614
Build.soc. 45.0 2143.8 17.2% 25.6% 2268.2 11.3% 25.6% 2339.6 9.2% 23.9% 3156.1 13.2
contracts 296  164 288 175 118 66 471  221
Whole 50.0 2330.5 22.9% 39.2% 2460.7 215.8% 26.3% 2299.7 21.3% 26.3% 3210.2 15.8
life ins. 328  184 441 256 150 85 520  212
Private old- 19.7 1896.0 6.3% 11.7% 2577.5 2.7% 26.6% 2512.5 7.0% 20.2% 3189.8 4.2%
age 129  52 131  58 119  44 380  93 
Bonds 16.7 2412.4 4.2% 13.3% 3402.3 4.8% 11.6% 2703.2 5.5% 7.8% 2908.1 3.3%
 109  54 150 79 54 29 153  64
Stocks/ 38.6 2309.6 16.1% 23.8% 3091.4 8.2% 20.10 2810.6 8.2% 5.1% 3513.1 6.1%
Fonds 253  160 268 160 93 47 298  123
None of 12.8 1117.4  16.5% 1242.1  23.9% 1242.1  25.2% 1978.6  
items 84   185 185 497  
Refusals 0.8% 1022.6 43.5% 1.2% 1638.9 38.7% 8.7% 2327.7 2.6% 12.6% 3413.9 47.6
 5  249 14  364 33  69 267  703 
Notes: Weighted values. Percentages and absolute observations presented. 
a Ownership of the asset category. 
b Conditional income means on item ownership. 
c Nonmissing observations on ownership question. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Contentment with health, work, housing, income, and the general living situation 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003 
CAPI samples. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means `completely dissatisfied' and 10 `totally 
satisfied'. 
Figure 2: Differences in contentment with health, work, housing, income, and the genereal living situation 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003 
CAPI samples. 
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Figure 3: Contentment with health, work, housing, income, and the general living situation 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for both 2003 subsamples. 
 
Figure 4: Contentment with health, work, housing, income, and the general living situation 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Pooled samples in 2001 and 2003. 
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Figure 5: Income development: panel comparison 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003 CAPI 
samples. 
Figure 6: Income development: all SAVE subsamples 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. 
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Figure 7: Expectations for health and financial situation 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003 CAPI 
samples. 
Figure 8: Differences in expectations for health and financial situation 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003 CAPI 
samples. 
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Figure 9: Expectations for health and financial situation 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. 
Figure 10: Expectations for health and financial situatio 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Pooled samples in 2001 and 2003. 
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Figure 11: Importance of different saving motives 
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Notes: Weighted values. 
Figure 12: Differences in savings motives by expectations for Germany’s economic development 
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Notes: Unweighted values.  Pessimists are defined as respondents whose expectation for Germany's economic 
development deteriorated by more than two points on a scale from 0 to 10. 
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Figure 13: Investment allocation of financial assets (ownership rates) 
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Notes: Weighted values. Private old-age provision question changed between 2001 and 2003. 
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Figure 14: Risk taking 
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Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. 
Figure 15: Risk judgement and involvement probabilities 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for the 2004 TPI subsample only. Weighted values. 0 
means very unprobable to engage in activity / not judging risky at all. 
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Figure 16: Likelihood of choosing lotteries with different expected values 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for the 2004 TPI subsample only. 
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Figure 17: Portfolio compositions of by subsamples 
33.4%
17.2%22.9%
6.3%
4.2%
16.1%
48.7%
11.3%
23.1%
2.7%
4.8%
9.4%
48.9%
9.2%
21.3%
7.0%
5.4%
8.2%
57.4%
13.2%
15.8%
4.2%3.3%
6.1%
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001
CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Saving accounts Build.Soc.agreem.
Whole life ins. Priv. old-age prov.
Bonds Stocks/Fonds
 
Notes: Weighted values. Private old-age provision question changed between 2001 and 2003. 
Figure 18: Portfolio compositions by age classes 
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